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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 
 Consistent with our certificate of appealability, Appellant Fred Wilson claims that 
the admission of certain statements of his co-defendant violated his Confrontation Clause 
rights.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Wilson’s 
petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.1
I. 
 
A jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County found Fred Wilson 
guilty of first degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy based on the shooting death of 
Benjamin Milla.  The facts of the conviction stemmed from a robbery and shooting 
allegedly involving Wilson, Johnell Haines, and a third man whose identity is unknown. 
Wilson was tried jointly with Haines.  Wilson was eligible for the death penalty, but was 
ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Wilson appealed the decision to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, arguing that his 
Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968), 
were violated.  In its opinion addressing the issues, the Trial Court concluded that 
                                              
1 The Court expresses its gratitude to the Duquesne University School of Law students 
and professors for their able pro bono representation of the Appellant in this matter. 
3 
 
Wilson’s Bruton claim was meritorious in light of the then-recent Supreme Court 
decision in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), which had been decided after 
Wilson’s trial.  Accordingly, the Trial Court concluded that Wilson should be granted a 
new trial.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court disagreed.  It held that Gray did not affect 
the outcome of Wilson’s case and affirmed the judgment of sentence.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denied allocatur. 
Wilson then filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”) which did not reassert the Bruton claim.  The PCRA Court dismissed the 
PCRA petition, and Wilson appealed.  While his PCRA appeal was pending, Wilson filed 
a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District Court.  The District Court 
dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice, allowing Wilson to complete his PCRA 
litigation. The Superior Court ultimately affirmed the PCRA Court, and the Supreme 
Court denied allocatur. 
Wilson then filed the instant habeas petition. The Magistrate Judge recommended 
that one claim be dismissed as procedurally barred, and that the remaining claim be 
denied on the merits.  After rejecting Wilson’s objections, the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.  We granted Wilson a certificate of appealability on 
the question of whether his Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton were violated by 
the use of Haines’ two redacted written confessions at trial.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over Wilson’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the 
District Court’s ruling in this case “relied exclusively on the state court record and did 
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not hold an evidentiary hearing on habeas review,” our review is plenary.  Gibbs v. 
Frank,  387 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2004).  “An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . 
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, . . . [or] resulted in a decision 
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 
presented in the State court proceedings.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
III. 
Wilson was tried jointly with codefendant Haines, who provided various 
confessions to the police.  After Haines was arrested in Indiana, Pennsylvania, he gave a 
videotaped confession as well as a written confession.  Five days later, now in the 
custody of the Philadelphia police, Haines gave another written confession.  All three 
statements were admitted into evidence at trial.  In an effort to comply with Bruton, 
Haines’ two written statements were redacted to replace explicit references to Wilson and 
the third man allegedly involved in the robbery with the terms “other guy,” “other guys,” 
or “them.”  The taped confession was also redacted.  In place of explicit references to 
Wilson or the third participant, Haines’ voice went silent on the tape.2
                                              
2 Wilson’s state court briefs only complained of Haines’s two written confessions, and 
made no mention of the videotaped confession. As a result, the Magistrate Judge’s Report 
explained that any potential Bruton claim tied to the taped confession would be 
unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.  Because we agreed with the Magistrate Judge’s 
cogent analysis, we declined to issue a certificate of appealability on issues pertaining to 
the videotaped confession. 
  The Trial Court 
read the jury a cautionary instruction during the trial and in the final instructions that 
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Haines’ statements were to be considered only as evidence against him and not against 
Wilson.  In his habeas petition, Wilson asserts a violation of his Confrontation Clause 
rights under Bruton and seeks relief on those grounds.  We will, however, put Wilson’s 
argument aside.  We assume, without deciding, that the admission of Haines’ redacted 
confession was a violation of Wilson’s Confrontation Clause rights.  We nevertheless 
conclude that such an error was harmless.   
IV. 
On collateral review of a state court criminal judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,  
“an error is harmless unless it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury’s verdict.”  Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We conclude that the evidence introduced against Wilson 
satisfies the Fry standard. 
Evidence established that Wilson had a business relationship with the victim.  
Wilson had repeatedly telephoned Milla’s house the day of the murder.  Further, the 
prosecution introduced Wilson’s own statements to a police informant.  Ricky Williams, 
a police informant, testified that a month after Milla’s murder, he met with Wilson and 
Wilson told him that Milla was dead.  Wilson then told Williams that  
he had gotten his crew together because [Milla] didn’t want to 
pay him some money which they had a transaction of a check 
and that he went to [Milla]’s house and called on the phone 
and then his crew or whoever went in [Milla]’s house and had 
shot him in the leg or something like that.   
 
Wilson was also recorded as admitting to entering Milla’s house with his “squad” and 
that he “nailed” Milla because he had the money.  This statement not only corroborated 
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the testimony of Milla’s girlfriend that Wilson repeatedly telephoned, but also provided 
the jury with a basis to conclude that Wilson admitted to the crimes--Wilson “nailed” 
him.     
In the face of this evidence against Wilson, and absent any evidence introduced to 
exonerate him, the admission of Haines’ redacted statements and the subsequent 
reference to those statements as “redacted” did not have the required “substantial and 
injurious effect” on the fairness of Wilson’s trial and conviction.  See, e.g., Fry, supra; 
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972) (even under a more stringent standard for 
harmlessness, any error committed by admitting a codefendant's statement was harmless 
where defendant's confession and corroborating evidence more than adequately 
established guilt).  Any impermissible inferences drawn about Wilson from Haines’ 
redacted statements would merely have been cumulative of the evidence of Wilson’s 
involvement and presence.   
V. 
 Since any Confrontation Clause violations that may have occurred at Wilson’s 
trial are harmless, we conclude that no state decision was “contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  
Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Wilson’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
